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A DISTINCTION WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE? 
ERISA PREEMPTION AND THE UNTENABLE 
DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF 
REVOCATION-ON-DIVORCE AND  
SLAYER STATUTES 
Abstract: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
ISA) was enacted in large part to protect employee benefit plan partici-
pants. Yet ERISA’s broad preemption clause may actually thwart this goal 
in certain cases by imposing unexpected consequences on participants 
who die before appropriately updating their beneficiary designations. For 
instance, although many state laws presume divorce to revoke the former 
spouse’s beneficiary status, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in 
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner made clear that ERISA preempts such state-
level wills doctrines, enabling a former spouse to benefit when the de-
ceased participant likely intended otherwise. The rationale behind this 
broad preemption provision applies equally to other wills doctrines such 
as “slayer statutes,” which prevent murderers from benefitting from their 
crimes. Therefore, it is likely impossible to confine the impact of this pre-
emptive effect to the divorce realm. Moreover, in the wake of Kennedy v. 
Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 2009, the federal common law no longer appears 
to be a valid solution to this problem of effecting the likely intent of de-
ceased plan participants. Congressional action to amend ERISA is there-
fore necessary to avoid these inequitable results. 
Introduction 
 If a wife murders her husband, she stands to answer for her crime 
through the criminal justice system.1 But what is to be done with the 
husband’s estate if under his will he leaves all of his property to his kil-
ler?2 In the typical case, state “slayer statutes” prevent a murderer from 
benefitting from her crime by inheriting from the victim, and treat the 
murderous spouse as having predeceased the victim for inheritance 
 
1 See In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 476 (Vt. 1966); Restatement (Third) of 
Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 8.4 (2003). 
2 See Mahoney, 220 A.2d at 477 (describing the various approaches taken by states when 
faced with this question). 
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purposes.3 Generally, this policy is broad enough to include transfers of 
nonprobate assets such as life insurance policies or revocable trusts.4 
Yet, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases concerning the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) have called into question whether 
slayer statutes can be harmonized with the broad preemptive effect of 
ERISA to apply to an employee benefit plan.5 As a result, the equitable 
outcome dictated by the slayer rule may now be far less secure than it 
once seemed.6 
                                                                                                                     
 Disputes over ERISA plan benefits arising out of spousal homicide 
are relatively rare.7 Far more common, however, are instances in which 
spouses divorce but fail to update their estate plans—and their ERISA 
beneficiaries in particular—to reflect this changed status before death.8 
States have almost uniformly adopted laws establishing a presumption 
that divorce revokes any bequests made to spouses in wills predating 
the divorce, and that the divorce renders such wills stale.9 Although a 
number of states have extended this revocation-on-divorce presump-
tion to nonprobate assets such as insurance beneficiary designations, 
the landmark case Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, decided by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 2001, prevented such laws from applying in the employee 
benefit plan context by finding that those laws are preempted by ER-
ISA.10 Had the state law applied in Egelhoff, the deceased husband’s 
benefits would have passed to his estate to be distributed via the pro-
bate process to his two children from a prior marriage.11 Instead, the 
Supreme Court held that ERISA required that the former wife receive 
the benefits of the pension plan—despite already having received her 
share of the marital property under the divorce agreement—because 
 
3 See, e.g., Unif. Probate Code § 2-803 (2008); see also Jesse Dukeminier et al., 
Wills, Trusts, & Estates 149–51 (8th ed. 2009). 
4 See N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (applying the slayer 
rule to insurance); Unif. Probate Code § 2-803 (2008) (extending the slayer statute to 
cover all probate and nonprobate assets). 
5 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 129 
S. Ct. 865, 877 n.14 (2009); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001). 
6 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 n.14; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152. 
7 See Admin. Comm. for the H.E.B. Inv. & Ret. Plan v. Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761 
(E.D. Tex. 2002); Barry L. Salkin, Slayer Statutes in the ERISA Context, Benefits L.J., Summer 
2010, at 4, 5 (noting that few such cases ever appear before the U.S. Circuit Courts of Ap-
peal). 
8 See Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 Quinnip-
iac Prob. L.J. 83, 124 (2004). 
9 See David S. Lebolt, Making the Best of Egelhoff: Federal Common Law for ERISA-
Preempted Beneficiary Designations, J. Pension Plan. & Compliance, Fall 2002, at 29, 33–34. 
10 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150. 
11 See id. at 145. 
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the husband had failed to change his pension beneficiary designation 
in the weeks between the divorce and his death.
 Egelhoff and the cases decided in its wake have called into question 
the limits of ERISA preemption, not only for revocation-on-divorce cas-
es, but also for cases involving similar doctrines regarding the subsidi-
ary law of wills.13 Although traditionally deferring to states for matters 
of family and probate law, ERISA’s unusual preemption scheme has 
permitted it to extend broadly, preempting any state laws that “relate 
to” the administration of a plan governed by the statute.14 This leads to 
uncertain results for the slayer rule, as well as other wills doctrines such 
as those governing survivorship in cases of simultaneous death15 and 
those that relax the strict compliance rules to allow for substantial 
compliance or harmless error.16 These doctrines are all intended to 
effect the presumptive intent of the testator, and yet are all burdened 
by the preemption provisions of ERISA, a perverse result for a statute 
enacted with a similarly remedial goal.17 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of ERISA’s operation and 
the application of its broad preemption scheme.18 Part II examines the 
interaction of ERISA with the subsidiary laws of wills and will substi-
tutes, culminating in the Egelhoff case.19 Part III explores Egelhoff’s far-
reaching effects in the state and federal court systems and its ramifica-
tions beyond the divorce realm; it then considers whether slayer stat-
utes may properly be distinguished, particularly considering the effect 
of Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2009.20 Part IV discusses the fed-
eral common law approach in light of Kennedy and several other poten-
 
12 See id. at 150. 
13 See id. at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The subsidiary law of wills refers to the 
“rules of construction and other rules applicable to testamentary dispositions.” See Re-
statement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 7.2 (2003). 
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
15 See Estate of Morgan v. Estate of Morgan, No. 50133-0-I, 2004 WL 500860, at *3–4 
(Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004). 
16 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 566–68 (7th Cir. 2002). 
17 See, e.g., John H. Langbein et al., Pension & Employee Benefits Law 793–94 (4th 
ed. 2006) (questioning whether the courts are disproportionately concerned with ease of 
plan administration at the expense of protecting pension plan participants); Lebolt, supra 
note 9, at 35 (arguing that the states’ “vast experience dealing with the questions of dona-
tive intent and family law that arise in matters of wealth transfer on death,” coupled with 
the fact that revocation on divorce “further[s] the purposes of ERISA,” makes preemption 
of such laws imprudent). 
18 See infra notes 22–52 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 53–95 and accompanying text. 
20 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 878; infra notes 96–182 and accompanying text. 
1484 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1481 
tial solutions to this problem, and ultimately concludes that without 
congressional action to amend ERISA, the equitable outcome of the 
slayer rule and other state-level subsidiary laws of wills may be similarly 
imperiled.21 
I. Overview of ERISA’s Policies and Preemption Scheme 
 Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA) in 1974 to protect employees who participate in employee 
benefit plans by establishing nationally uniform standards for such 
plans.22 A primary goal of ERISA was to “increase the likelihood that 
participants and beneficiaries . . . receive their full benefits,” protecting 
those who had paid into pension funds from potential employer col-
lapse and pension plan underfunding.23 The statute also requires that 
all pension plans “provide that benefits provided under the plan may 
not be assigned or alienated.”24 Because employers are not obligated to 
offer their employees such plans, however, and fearing that onerous 
regulation might cause employers to forgo plan administration alto-
gether, Congress also noted that an additional policy of ERISA was “to 
encourage the maintenance and growth of single-employer defined 
benefit pension plans.”25 To effect that policy, Congress put forth a 
comprehensive scheme, in 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c), to federalize and uni-
formly regulate such plans.26 The statute further required plan admin-
istrators to establish and maintain plans “pursuant to a written instru-
ment”27 and to regulate plans “in accordance with the documents and 
                                                                                                                      
21 See infra notes 183–255 and accompanying text. 
22 See Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 832–33 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001); see 
also Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44 (1987). Section 1002 defines “employee 
pension benefit plan” and “pension plan” as “any plan, fund, or program . . . established or 
maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, . . . [that] pro-
vides retirement income to employees, or results in a deferral of income by employees for 
periods extending to the termination of employment or beyond . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002 
(2)(A) (2006). Similarly, “employee benefit plan” is defined as “an employee welfare bene-
fit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee welfare 
benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan.” Id. § 1002(3). 
23 Id. § 1001b(c). The impetus for the creation of ERISA is often traced to the highly 
publicized “Studebaker incident,” in which the closing of an Indiana automobile plant left 
many of its workers without their expected pensions after the plan had been grossly under-
funded. See Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 72–87. 
24 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). This is also known as the spendthrift clause and is intended 
to ensure that participants are provided for during retirement. See Dukeminier et al., 
supra note 3, at 624; Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 268–70. 
25 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(2); see also Lebolt, supra note 9, at 32. 
26 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(2); see also Lebolt, supra note 9, at 32. 
27 See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). 
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plans governing them,” a requirement referred to as the “plan docu-
ments” rule.28 
 This Part describes two defining features of ERISA.29 The first is 
the statute’s broad preemption provision, which supplants any state 
laws that “relate to” the employee benefit field.30 The second involves 
the 1984 amendments to ERISA’s statutory scheme enacted to protect a 
group overlooked by the statute’s original iteration: the non-employee 
spouses of ERISA plan participants.31 
A. ERISA’s Broad Preemption Provisions 
 In order to further the policies set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)— 
particularly balancing employee and beneficiary protection against em-
ployer incentive to offer retirement plans—Congress included a broad 
preemption provision within ERISA’s statutory scheme.32 Preemption 
under ERISA takes two forms: conflict (or direct) preemption, which 
applies to those state laws that directly conflict with ERISA’s explicit re-
quirements; and “relate-to” preemption, which is the more controversial 
theory for finding state laws preempted by ERISA.33 This latter provi-
 
28 See id. § 1104(a)(1)(D); see also Kennedy v. Plan Adm’r for DuPont Sav. & Inv. Plan, 
129 S. Ct. 865, 868 n.14 (2009) (demonstrating the power of the “plan documents” rule). 
29 See infra notes 32–52 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 32–40 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 41–52 and accompanying text. 
32 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
33 See Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 758–61. Justice Scalia in particular has ex-
pressed concern with the current application of “relate-to” preemption as a test different 
from traditional notions of field preemption, and in several concurring opinions has 
noted his desire to apply the Court’s “established jurisprudence concerning conflict and 
field preemption” to such cases. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 152–
53 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring); Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham 
Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring). In an earlier concur-
rence joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Scalia similarly opined: 
I think it would greatly assist our function of clarifying the law if we simply ac-
knowledged that our first take on this statute was wrong; that the “relate to” 
clause of the pre-emption provision is meant, not to set forth a test for pre-
emption, but rather to identify the field in which ordinary field pre-emption ap-
plies—namely, the field of laws regulating “employee benefit plan[s] de-
scribed in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) 
of this title,” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
Dillingham Constr., 519 U.S. at 336. Field preemption as an approach to the “relate-to” 
problem is also supported by the legislative history. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 
U.S. 85, 98–99 (1983) (describing the legislative history of ERISA, including various sena-
tors’ remarks explaining that ERISA would “preempt the field” of employee benefits regu-
lation). 
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sion, found in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a), notes that ERISA supersedes all state 
laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans covered by ERISA.34 As the 
U.S. Supreme Court explained in 1983 in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., a 
state law “relates to” an ERISA plan “if it has a connection with or refer-
ence to such a plan.”35 The Supreme Court, despite “caution[ing] 
against an ‘uncritical literalism’ that would make preemption turn on 
‘infinite connections,’”36 has repeatedly noted that this provision is 
“clearly expansive” and has been interpreted in a broad fashion.37 
 The primary rationale for ERISA’s broad preemption provision is 
uniform plan administration, under the theory that without predictable 
federal standards, plan administrators facing uncertainty will encounter 
increased costs, which will then be passed along to participants.38 In ad-
dition, certain employers might simply opt out of offering pension plans 
to their employees altogether if faced with a “maze of different and con-
flicting state laws and regulations.”39 In this sense, the desire for uni-
form plan administration may be viewed as an extension of ERISA’s 
overarching goal of protecting employee participants and their benefi-
ciaries in the aggregate, although in individual cases the interests of 
plan administrators and participants are not always aligned.40 
                                                                                                                     
B. Protection of the Nonemployee Spouse 
 ERISA’s protective measures extend beyond the employee partici-
pants themselves, as the statutory scheme vigorously protects the surviv-
ing spouses of participants.41 Although somewhat overlooked in ER-
 
34 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). 
35 463 U.S. at 96–97. 
36 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995)). 
37 Id. at 146 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655) (noting that ERISA’s “relate to” pre-
emption provision is “clearly expansive” but not without limits); Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21 
(“Some state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote, or periph-
eral a manner to warrant a finding that the law ‘relates to’ the plan.”). 
38 See Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 44–46. 
39 See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
541, 546–47 (1998). 
40 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 149–50 (“Requiring ERISA administrators to master the rele-
vant laws of 50 states and to contend with litigation would undermine the congressional 
goal of ‘minimiz[ing] the administrative and financial burden[s]’ on plan administra-
tors—burdens ultimately borne by the plan beneficiaries.” (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. 
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990))). 
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2006); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 843 (1997) (“Congress’ 
concern for surviving spouses is also evident from the expansive coverage of § 1055, as 
amended by REA[ct].”). 
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ISA’s original iteration,42 nonemployee spousal protections became a 
crucial part of the ERISA framework with the passage of the Retirement 
Equity Act of 1984 (REAct).43 REAct most notably extends a qualified 
joint and survivor annuity (“QJSA”) to a nonemployee spouse when the 
participant dies after having reached retirement.44 It also extends an 
analogous annuity known as a qualified preretirement survivor annuity 
(“QPSA”) to a nonemployee spouse when the participant dies prior to 
retirement.45 In addition, REAct amended § 1055 to make it difficult 
for a married participant to designate a non-spouse as the beneficiary.46 
To do so, a spouse must validly waive her interest, and such a waiver 
must be made during the marriage and not as part of an antenuptial 
agreement.47 
 Moreover, REAct amended ERISA to curb its rigid application in 
divorce or other domestic relations issues.48 Recognizing the increasing 
importance of employee benefit plans and their growing role in both the 
divorce and child support contexts, Congress drafted REAct to include a 
limited exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation rule.49 This exception, ap-
plicable only to certain qualified domestic relations orders (“QDROs”), 
permitted state courts to assign all or part of a participant’s employee 
benefit plan to the nonemployee spouse within the context of a divorce 
decree.50 QDROs are also expressly exempted from ERISA preemption 
under § 1144(b)(7).51 As a result, in this limited capacity, such state do-
mestic relations orders dividing marital property during divorce can ef-
fectively modify beneficiary designations of former spouses provided that 
they meet all of the criteria set forth in § 1056(d)(3).52 
 
 
42 See Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 271–72. See generally Camilla E. Watson, Broken 
Promises Revisited: The Window of Vulnerability for Surviving Spouses Under ERISA, 76 Iowa L. 
Rev. 431 (1991) (describing the pre-REAct deficiencies of ERISA’s protections of non-
employee surviving spouses). 
43 Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1440–48 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402, 414, 417); see 
also Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 271–300, 794–95. 
44 See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d) (defining qualified joint and survivor annuity). 
45 See id. § 1055(e) (defining qualified preretirement survivor annuity). 
46 See id. § 1055; Boggs, 520 U.S. at 843. 
47 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c)(2)(A) (requiring written consent of a spouse for waiver). Pro-
spective spouses are thus not eligible to consent, and any attempt to waive their interests in 
their fiancés’ ERISA benefits through antenuptial agreements would fail accordingly. See 
id.; see also Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 276. 
48 See Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 282. 
49 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). 
50 See id. 
51 Id. § 1144(b)(7). 
52 Id. § 1056(d)(3). These requirements include: clearly identifying the names and ad-
dresses of the beneficiaries and any alternate payee and the plan to which the QDRO ap-
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II. The Intersection of ERISA Preemption and the  
Substantive Law of Wills 
 Designating a beneficiary under an ERISA plan is only one manner 
of transmitting property at death, a realm otherwise chiefly occupied by 
the states.53 This Part explores state-level attempts to unify probate and 
non-probate property, thereby carrying out decedents’ presumptive in-
tent, and considers how ERISA preemption alters this analysis, often to 
the detriment of decedents who participated in ERISA plans.54 
A. State-Level Responses to the Increasing Importance of Employee Benefit Plans 
and Other Nonprobate Assets 
 The rise of employee benefit plans and the need for federal regu-
lation via ERISA coincided with another remedial trend that was sweep-
ing the country at the state level: a trend of revising outmoded probate 
laws to better reflect the presumptive intent of the testator and to unify 
the laws of wills and will substitutes.55 A vast majority of the states, for 
instance, have now adopted statutes which presume that divorce re-
vokes devises made to former spouses in wills executed before the di-
vorce.56 Such revocation-on-divorce statutes, many modeled upon the 
analogous provision of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), are intended 
to carry out a decedent’s presumptive intent, under the assumption 
                                                                                                                      
plies; making no attempt to modify the type of benefit offered by the plan; and making no 
attempt to require payment to a beneficiary named in another QDRO. Id. 
53 See Lebolt, supra note 9, at 35. 
54 See infra notes 55–95 and accompanying text. See generally John H. Langbein, The 
Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1108 (1984) 
(discussing the increasing role of nonprobate assets within the estate planning framework 
and recommending uniform application of subsidiary wills doctrines to probate and non-
probate assets alike). Probate property refers to any property that passes under a will or by 
intestacy, whereas nonprobate property involves property that passes at death via another 
mechanism. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 38–39. The term “will substitute” is 
used interchangeably with “nonprobate property,” and includes transfers such as life in-
surance, pension plan survivor benefits, and joint tenancies in realty or bank accounts. Id. 
55 See T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 185, 185–87 (2004) 
(noting that the state-level trend toward unifying probate and nonprobate property under 
the substantive law of wills is on a “collision course” with the broad federal scope of ERISA 
preemption); Langbein, supra note 54, at 1108; see also Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multi-
ple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 
223, 228–29 (1991) (discussing the Uniform Probate Code’s efforts to effect the “likely 
intent” of the decedent). 
56 See Unif. Probate Code § 2-804 (2008); Eunice L. Ross & Thomas J. Reed, Will 
Contests, § 5:19 (2d ed. 2011) (listing the forty-five states with revocation-on-divorce rules 
in effect for probate transfers to former spouses). 
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that a decedent most likely would prefer not to transmit property to a 
former spouse.57 
 Certain states, however, have taken this policy a step further, ex-
tending revocation-on-divorce to encompass the increasingly important 
realm of nonprobate property, which accounts for a significant share of 
the average person’s assets.58 Nonprobate assets, also known as will sub-
stitutes, are a form of property which passes at death by a mechanism 
other than the probate process, including joint tenancies, life insur-
ance, and many other assets.59 As a result, in a substantial minority of 
the states, a designation of a former spouse as a life insurance or pen-
sion plan beneficiary, if made before divorce, is presumed to be re-
voked upon divorce, a position endorsed by both the UPC and the Re-
statement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers.60 Because 
employee benefit plans are a common form of will substitute, clashes 
between the strict federal preemption scheme of ERISA and state regu-
lation of the transmission of nonprobate property at death were virtu-
ally inevitable.61 
 
57 See Waggoner, supra note 55, at 228–29. 
58 See Langbein, supra note 54, at 1109 (“It would not be unusual for someone in mid-
life to have more than a dozen will substitutes in force, whether or not he has a will.”); see 
also Gary, supra note 8, at 84 (describing the state-level statutory expansion of revocation-
on-divorce into nonprobate assets as “fill[ing] a necessary gap in protection for divorced 
persons”). 
59See Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 38–39. 
60 See Unif. Probate Code § 2-804 (2008); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & 
Other Donative Transfers § 7.2 & cmt. (2003) (noting that substantive law of wills 
should apply to non-probate property “to the extent appropriate” so as to further “the 
policy of unifying the law of wills and will substitutes”). Section 2-804 of the UPC states: 
[D]ivorce or annulment of a marriage . . . revokes any revocable disposition 
or appointment of property made by a divorced individual to his [or her] 
former spouse in a governing instrument and any disposition or appointment 
created by law or in a governing instrument to a relative of the divorced indi-
vidual’s former spouse. 
Unif. Probate Code § 2-804 (2008) (second alteration in original). The comment to Sec-
tion 2-804 further explains that the section is “intend[ed] to unify the law of probate and 
nonprobate transfers,” and was expanded “to cover ‘will substitutes’ such as revocable in-
ter-vivos trusts, life-insurance and retirement-plan beneficiary designations, transfer-on-
death accounts, and other revocable dispositions to the former spouse that the divorced 
individual established before the divorce (or annulment).” Unif. Probate Code § 2-804 
cmt. (2008). 
61 See Unif. Probate Code § 2-804(h)(2) (2008). The drafters of the UPC foresaw 
such a conflict and attempted to circumvent it. See id. (stating that a former spouse is “ob-
ligated to return” the benefits received if ERISA preempts a state revocation-on-divorce 
law); see also Sarabeth A. Rayho, Note, Divorcees Turn About in Their Graves as Ex-Spouses Cash 
In: Codified Constructive Trusts Ensure an Equitable Result Regarding ERISA-Governed Employee 
Benefit Plans, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 373, 378 (2007). 
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B. Boggs v. Boggs: ERISA Preempts State Community Property Laws 
 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Boggs v. Boggs in 1997 rein-
forced the expansiveness of ERISA preemption and demonstrated the 
potential for conflict between ERISA and state laws governing the 
transfer of property at death.62 In this case, Sandra Boggs brought an 
action against her late husband Isaac Boggs’s two sons by his first mar-
riage to Dorothy Boggs, seeking declaratory judgment that she alone 
was entitled to his pension benefits.63 Dorothy’s will left her half-
interest in Isaac’s pension plan to the sons from their marriage; under 
Louisiana community property law she owned a half-interest in his 
earnings during the marriage and could convey that interest at death.64 
Sandra, however, contested her stepsons’ interest in the property, argu-
ing that Dorothy’s conveyance was preempted by ERISA and was thus 
invalid.65 The Supreme Court agreed, noting that “ERISA’s solicitude 
for the economic security of surviving spouses would be undermined 
by allowing a predeceasing spouse’s heirs and legatees to have a com-
munity property interest in the survivor’s annuity.”66 Applying princi-
ples of conflicts preemption, the Supreme Court held that Sandra was 
the proper beneficiary of the plan.67 Ultimately, Boggs signaled that the 
historical deference to state laws in areas of traditional state concern— 
such as probate and family law—was in jeopardy.68 
C. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff: The Collision of Revocation-on-Divorce  
and ERISA Preemption 
 In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court again considered the limits of 
ERISA preemption in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, in which a Wash-
                                                                                                                      
62 See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 835–41 (1997). 
63 Id. at 837. Marital property in Louisiana is held as community property. See Duke-
minier et al., supra note 3, at 469–71. Unlike the system of separate property employed by 
a majority of the states, where each spouse retains separate ownership of the assets owned 
before the marriage or earned during its duration, community property systems assign half 
of the combined total marital income to each spouse. Id. This entitles each spouse to dis-
pose of his or her share as he or she so desires, including the right to alienate the property 
or transmit it at death. See id. See generally Kathy T. Graham, The Uniform Marital Property Act: 
A Solution for Common Law Property Systems?, 48 S.D. L. Rev. 455 (2003) (examining the 
largely unsuccessful Uniform Marital Property Act as a community property system which 
codifies the partnership theory of marriage). 
64 Boggs, 520 U.S. at 836–37. 
65 Id. at 837. 
66 Id. at 843. 
67 See id. at 844. 
68 See id. at 854–74 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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ington statute was challenged on the grounds that it was impermissibly 
related to the administration of employee benefit plans and was thus 
preempted by ERISA.69 In that case, the decedent David Egelhoff died 
intestate two months after his divorce from petitioner Donna Rae Egel-
hoff, leaving two children from an earlier marriage.70 Washington’s 
intestacy statute, following the UPC’s attempt to unify probate and non-
probate property for such purposes, declared that divorce revoked all 
probate and nonprobate transfers to the former spouse if the designa-
tion was made prior to the divorce.71 As a result, under state law, Da-
vid’s heirs at law were his two children from the previous marriage.72 
 Through his employer, David had participated in a pension plan 
and had a life insurance policy, both of which were governed by ER-
ISA.73 Under both plans, David had named Donna as his beneficiary.74 
When the couple’s assets were divided during the divorce proceedings, 
David was awarded full ownership of his pension and life insurance pol-
icies.75 Two months after the divorce, however, David was killed in an 
accident.76 Following the divorce and before his death, he had ne-
glected to formally change the beneficiary of his policies, leaving 
Donna listed as his beneficiary under the plan documents on file with 
the plan administrators.77 
 
69 532 U.S. 141, 144 (2001). 
70 See id. 
71 See id. (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 11.07.010(2)(a) (1994)). The Washington Re-
vised Code § 11.07.010(a)(2) provided: 
If a marriage is dissolved or invalidated, a provision made prior to that event 
that relates to the payment or transfer at death of the decedent’s interest in a 
nonprobate asset in favor of or granting an interest or power to the dece-
dent’s former spouse is revoked. A provision affected by this section must be 
interpreted, and the nonprobate asset affected passes, as if the former spouse 
failed to survive the decedent, having died at the time of entry of the decree 
of dissolution or declaration of invalidity. 
Wash. Rev. Code § 11.07.010(2)(a) (1994). 
72 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 144. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. In dissent, however, Justice Breyer notes that David did more than simply declare 
Donna his beneficiary—he instead named “Donna R. Egelhoff wife,” effectively designating 
a person who ceased to exist once the divorce took effect. See id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added). In so doing, Justice Breyer argued, David intended the benefit 
to be revoked upon divorce, which is precisely the result that the Washington statute would 
have yielded. Id. 
75 Id. at 159. 
76 Id. at 144 (majority opinion). 
77 Id. 
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 After David’s death, his two children from his previous marriage 
argued that they were the proper beneficiaries of his life insurance and 
pension plans based on the application of the Washington statute, 
which would revoke Donna’s status as beneficiary upon divorce.78 In 
two separate actions involving the life insurance and pension benefits, 
the trial courts granted summary judgment in favor of Donna, deter-
mining that ERISA preempted the Washington statute and that both 
the life insurance and pension plans should be paid to Donna under 
the plan documents.79 On appeal, the life insurance and pension cases 
were consolidated, and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed.80 
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the Court of Appeals, 
concluding that the Washington statute’s application was far broader 
than ERISA’s domain, as it “does not apply immediately and exclusively 
to an ERISA plan, nor is the existence of such a plan essential to opera-
tion of the statute.”81 
 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the preemp-
tion question that had divided state and federal courts.82 Ultimately, 
applying the “relate-to” preemption doctrine in spite of several Justices’ 
reservations,83 the Supreme Court concluded that ERISA did in fact 
preempt the Washington statute’s revocation-on-divorce statute.84 The 
Court emphasized the importance of uniform plan administration, not-
ing that plan administrators should not be expected to keep abreast of 
the nuances of all fifty states to carry out their fiduciary obligation to 
pay benefits under the plan documents.85 As a result, Donna, not the 
children who were David’s heirs at law under Washington intestacy law, 
was entitled to the entirety of the life insurance and pension plan bene-
fits.86 
 Justice Breyer dissented from the Egelhoff majority, noting his con-
cerns about both the inequity of the result and the limits of the major-
ity’s pronouncement.87 The couple, having recently divorced, had allo-
                                                                                                                      
78 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 144–45. 
79 Id. at 145. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 145 (quoting In re Estate of Egelhoff, 989 P.2d 80, 89 (Wash. 1999)). 
82 Id. at 146; see also George A. Norwood, Who Is Entitled to Receive a Deceased Participant’s 
ERISA Retirement Plan Benefits—An Ex-Spouse or Current Spouse? The Federal Circuits Have an 
Irreconcilable Conflict, 33 Gonz. L. Rev. 61, 65–71(1998). 
83 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152–53 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note 33. 
84 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 143, 146–47. 
85 Id. at 148. 
86 Id. at 146–47. 
87 Id. at 159–61(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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cated their assets in what they determined was an appropriate man-
ner.88 As Justice Breyer explained, the practical outcome of the deci-
sion yields the uncomfortable result of “permit[ting] a divorced wife, 
who already acquired, during the divorce proceeding, her fair share of 
the couple’s community property, to receive in addition the benefits 
that the divorce court awarded to her former husband.”89 The state 
law’s result—permitting David’s children, rather than his former 
spouse, to receive the benefits of the insurance and pension plan—
better reflected the decedent’s presumed inte
 In addition, Justice Breyer’s dissent raised serious concerns about 
the limits of the Egelhoff opinion on ERISA preemption, particularly 
with respect to other doctrines traditionally governed by state law.91 For 
instance, slayer statutes—state laws which prevent a murderous spouse 
from profiting by killing the other spouse—affect ERISA similarly to 
revocation-on-divorce provisions, as do those statutes governing survi-
vorship presumptions in cases of simultaneous spousal death.92 The 
majority was dismissive of this concern, noting that slayer statutes were 
not before the Court and that even if they were, the Court might dis-
tinguish them from revocation-on-divorce because the former were 
“more or less uniform nationwide.”93 Justice Breyer, however, observed 
that this purported uniformity did not in fact reflect the reality of the 
nation’s slayer statutes, which arguably exhibit even more variety 
among the states than revocation-on-divorce statutes.94 As a result, Jus-
tice Breyer expressed his concern that the majority’s pronouncement 
in Egelhoff could not logically be cabined to exclude these similar doc-
trines.95 
III. The Limits of Preemption: State and Federal Courts’ 
Responses to Egelhoff 
 This Part explores the viability of certain subsidiary wills doctrines 
as applied to ERISA plans in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
in Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner in 2001.96 In this Part, Section A ex-
 
88 Id. at 159. 
89 Id. 
90 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 158–59 (citing Langbein, supra note 54, at 1135). 
91 See id. at 159–61. 
92 See id. at 159–60. 
93 See id. at 152 (majority opinion). 
94 See id. at 160 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
95 See id. at 159–60. 
96 See 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001); infra notes 101–182 and accompanying text. 
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amines the treatment of slayer statutes in state and federal courts since 
2001.97 Section B discusses the similar effects on simultaneous death 
and substantial compliance doctrines, which have generally been found 
either not preempted or, in the alternative, preempted but saved under 
federal common law.98 As Section C cautions, however, the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for Du-
Pont Savings & Investment Plan may have eliminated the federal com-
mon law solution as applied to these doctrines.99 These ramifications of 
the Kennedy decision are then taken up in Part IV.100 
A. Slayer Statutes 
 Courts have traditionally viewed slayer statutes as immune to ER-
ISA preemption,101 a position maintained in part by a number of courts 
even in the wake of Egelhoff.102 Such conclusions are often justified by 
reference to the longstanding tradition of slayer statutes and the wide-
spread adoption of these types of laws throughout the country.103 The 
                                                                                                                      
97 See infra notes 101–140 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 141–165 and accompanying text. 
99 See 129 S. Ct. 865, 870–77 (2009); infra notes 166–182 and accompanying text. 
100 See infra notes 183–255 and accompanying text. 
101 See, e.g., New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. Newman, 784 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (E.D. 
La. 1992); Mendez-Bellido v. Bd. of Trs. of Div. 1181, A.T.U. N.Y. Emps. Pension Fund & 
Plan, 709 F. Supp. 329, 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 
320–22. For example, in Mendez-Bellido the court explained that: 
[A] state law prohibiting a killer from profiting from her crime is not pre-
empted by ERISA. This common law rule is rooted in public policy and has 
broad application to insurance policies, wills and intestacy. The application of 
this rule to pension plans governed by ERISA will not affect the determina-
tion of an employee’s eligibility for benefits, . . . nor will it impact on the 
method of calculating the amount of benefits due. 
709 F. Supp. at 331. 
102 See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Camm, No. 4:02-cv-00106-DFH-WGH, 2007 WL 
2316480, at *3–6 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 6, 2007); Atwater v. Nortel Networks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 2d 
610, 614–15 (M.D.N.C. 2005); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497 
(W.D. Va. 2005), aff’d by 142 F. App’x 690(4th Cir. 2005); Admin. Comm. for the H.E.B. 
Inv. & Ret. Plan v. Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 759, 761–62 (E.D. Tex. 2002). 
103 See N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886) (“It would be a 
reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money pay-
able on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover 
insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired.”); see also Riggs v. Palmer, 22 
N.E. 188, 191 (N.Y. 1889) (“[A] widow should not, for the purpose of acquiring, as such, 
property rights, be permitted to allege a widowhood which she has wickedly and inten-
tionally created.”). 
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Egelhoff majority hints at this position in dicta when dismissing the con-
cern that its holding would require invalidating slayer laws.104 
 Despite the Supreme Court’s dicta in Egelhoff purporting to distin-
guish slayer statutes from revocation-on-divorce laws applied to non-
probate assets, the distinction—and the rationale for treating these 
types of statutes differently—is difficult to discern.105 Federal district 
courts and state courts grappling with the issue have generally, but not 
uniformly, accepted the dicta in Egelhoff, but have hedged their rulings 
by giving an alternate basis for preventing slayers from profiting from 
their wrongful deeds: the federal common law.106 
1. Slayer Statutes Found Not Preempted by ERISA 
 One of the first slayer statute cases considered in the wake of Egel-
hoff was Administrative Committee for the H.E.B. Investment & Retirement Plan 
v. Harris, decided by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Texas in 2002.107 The plan administrators in Harris brought an action 
for declaratory judgment to determine the eligible beneficiary after the 
participant Mary Harris was killed by her husband Alfred.108 Mary had 
designated Alfred as the sole beneficiary under her employer-sponsored 
retirement plan and did not name a contingent beneficiary.109 Under 
Texas law, however, a slayer convicted of bringing about the death of the 
insured is barred as a beneficiary, which would disqualify Alfred from 
receiving the benefits.110 Instead, the funds are to be paid to contingent 
beneficiaries, or if none are named, then to the insured’s nearest rela-
 
104 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152. 
105 See id. at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Langbein et al., supra note 17, at 
796–97. 
106 See, e.g., Camm, 2007 WL 2316480, at *3–6 (“[T]his court has the option of not de-
ciding the preemption question because here the result would be the same under both the 
state statute and ERISA aided by federal common law.”); Atwater, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 614–15 
(“As the convicted murderer of the plan participant, [the husband] would have been 
barred from recovering the deceased’s ERISA benefits under either North Carolina’s slay-
er statute or under federal common law.”); Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 497 (concluding that 
the Virginia slayer statute is not preempted by ERISA, or in the alternative, that the slayer 
rule is incorporated into federal common law); Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 761–62 (conclud-
ing that the Texas slayer statute or federal common law would both prevent the slayer from 
taking from his victim’s estate); Mack v. Estate of Mack, 206 P.3d 98, 110–11 (Nev. 2009) 
(concluding that the Nevada slayer statute not preempted by ERISA). But see Ahmed v. 
Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424, 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (concluding that ERISA preempts 
Ohio slayer statute). 
107 See 217 F. Supp. 2d at 760–62. 
108 Id. at 760. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 760–61 (quoting Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 41(d) (West 1980)). 
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tives.111 Because Mary did not designate any contingent beneficiaries, 
her children stood to receive the benefits from the policy under Texas 
law.112 
 The Harris court, noting that “fortunately for the state of marital 
relations in America, a plethora of cases discussing ERISA preemption 
when one spouse kills another spouse does not exist,” still found sup-
port from several pre-Egelhoff cases,113 as well as Egelhoff itself,114 to con-
clude that ERISA did not preempt the Texas slayer statute.115 The court 
went on to determine that even if ERISA did preempt the slayer statute, 
the result would be identical under federal common law.116 To bolster 
this argument, the court highlighted the tradition of applying federal 
common law to fill gaps in federal statutes.117 It also noted that “the 
traditional deference given to state law in the area of family law sup-
ports a decision to borrow from state law when determining the federal 
common law for these issues.”118 
 Similarly, the court in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Riner, 
decided by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia in 
2005, hedged its ruling with respect to the preemption question.119 In 
that case, after Douglas Riner was convicted of murdering his wife De-
nise, the insurance company brought an interpleader action to deter-
mine who should receive the benefits of Denise’s ERISA plan.120 Ac-
knowledging that the preemption question was not settled, the court 
based its ruling—that Douglas was barred from benefitting—on the Vir-
gina statute, or alternatively on the identical outcome dictated by fed-
eral common law, declining to reach the preemption issue.121 The court 
noted that “[n]either Virginia’s slayer statute nor federal common law” 
would permit the slaying spouse to benefit from the homicide by receiv-
                                                                                                                      
111 Id. 
112 See id. 
113 See, e.g., Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1236–37; Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 331. 
114 The Harris court noted that in Egelhoff, “seven Justices joined an opinion that, in 
dicta, hinted that these Justices thought that ERISA did not preempt state slayer statutes.” 
Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 761 (citing Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 761; see Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98–99 
(1983). Federal common law may be applied when a federal statutory scheme includes 
gaps, permitting the courts to fill in such gaps to carry out the overall congressional intent 
behind the statutory scheme. See id. 
118 See Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 761. 
119 See 351 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 
120 Id. at 494. 
121 See id. at 497. 
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ing the deceased spouse’s ERISA benefits, and concluded that Congress 
“could not have intended” otherwise when it created ERISA.122 
 In 2009, the Nevada Supreme Court also endorsed the view that 
slayer statutes are not preempted by ERISA in Mack v. Estate of Mack.123 
In that case, the court faced a slightly different twist on the typical slayer 
case, in which a murderous spouse seeks to inherit from the victim’s es-
tate.124 Instead, Darren Mack, found guilty of murdering his wife Charla 
Mack, attempted to preclude his wife’s estate from claiming the agreed-
upon share of his pension benefits as ordered by the trial court during 
the divorce proceedings.125 The trial court judge had issued an oral rul-
ing, but before it was memorialized in writing, Darren had killed Charla 
and had shot the judge who had issued the agreement.126 Darren was 
found guilty of Charla’s murder and the attempted murder of the judge 
who presided over their divorce.127 The Nevada Supreme Court con-
cluded that Congress could not have intended to permit murderers to 
profit from their crimes and held that Darren could not use his wife’s 
murder to evade his financial obligations to her estate.128 
2. Ahmed v. Ahmed: Ohio Courts Find Preemption of the Slayer Statute 
 A minority of courts has concluded that the Egelhoff opinion, de-
spite its intimations to the contrary, must nevertheless be interpreted as 
preempting slayer statutes.129 In Ahmed v. Ahmed, in 2004, the Ohio 
Court of Appeals concluded that the Ohio slayer statute was preempted 
by ERISA.130 In that case, Lubaina Ahmed was killed by her husband 
Nawaz, leaving two sons, Ibtisam and Ahsan.131 As a physician, Lubaina 
was enrolled in her employer-sponsored life insurance policy, which was 
 
122 Id. 
123 See 206 P.2d at 110–11. 
124 See id. at 101, 104–05. 
125 See id. 
126 Id. at 104. 
127 Id. After being attacked by Darren, Judge Weller was replaced by a new judge for 
the remainder of the case. Id. at 104 n.4. The new judge permitted Judge Weller’s oral 
order to be memorialized in writing as a qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”). Id. 
128 See id. at 110. Although the Mack court’s opinion does not attempt to distinguish or 
directly mention Egelhoff, most likely because the oral division of marital property was later 
declared a valid QDRO, it does adopt the position taken in the majority of district courts 
to have considered the issue, implicitly endorsing the slayer statute dicta in Egelhoff. See id. 
(citing Atwater, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 614; Riner, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 497; Harris, 217 F. Supp. 2d 
at 761; Newman, 784 F. Supp. at 1236; Mendez-Bellido, 709 F. Supp. at 331). 
129 See Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d at 426. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. 
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governed by ERISA.132 Before her younger son Ahsan’s birth, Lubaina 
named her husband Nawaz as the beneficiary of the policy, with her 
elder son Ibtisam named as the contingent beneficiary.133 Lubaina 
failed to update the plan after Ahsan’s birth to name him as a second 
contingent beneficiary.134 
 Because Nawaz had been convicted of Lubaina’s murder, Ohio’s 
slayer statute treated him as having predeceased her.135 The result un-
der Ohio law would therefore convey the benefit of the entire policy to 
Ibtisam, the sole eligible beneficiary under the will, leaving Ahsan 
without a share of the sizeable policy.136 Instead, however, the court 
concluded that ERISA preemption applied under Egelhoff, and applying 
federal common law incorporating the slayer rule, determined that the 
policy was to be paid to Lubaina’s estate—which the two brothers 
would share equally.137 
 Critics of Ahmed have suggested that the court’s broad interpreta-
tion of Egelhoff stemmed in large part from a desire to avoid harming 
Lubaina’s younger son, Ahsan.138 Without finding ERISA preemption, 
Ahsan would effectively be prevented from sharing in the nonprobate 
asset comprising a large portion of his mother’s estate.139 The convo-
luted rationale of the Ahmed court may thus be partly attributable to the 
desire to treat both sons equally following the loss of their mother.140 
B. Other Doctrines: Simultaneous Death and Substantial Compliance 
 In addition to slayer statutes and revocation-on-divorce provisions, 
other aspects of state probate law may now face ERISA preemption 
scrutiny in the wake of Egelhoff.141 Courts have been divided about such 
                                                                                                                      
132 Id. at 426–27. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d at 427. 
136 Id. at 428. 
137 See id. at 433. 
138 See, e.g., Daniel J. Hoffheimer & Julia B. Meister, Ahmed v. Ahmed: The Ohio Slayer 
Statute, Common Law, and ERISA Preemption, 16 Prob. L.J. Ohio 53, 54 (2005); Peter S. Lin, 
Murdering the Slayer Statute Under the Pretense of ERISA Preemption: Ahmed v. Ahmed, 58 Tax 
Law. 767, 779–80 (2005). 
139 See Lin, supra note 138, at 779–80. 
140 See id.; see also Camm, 2007 WL 2316480, at *4–5 (distinguishing Ahmed, where “the 
choice between federal and state law would result in distribution of the life insurance pro-
ceeds to different innocent claimants”). 
141 See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 297 F.3d 558, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2002) (sub-
stantial compliance); Estate of Morgan v. Estate of Morgan, No. 50133-0-I, 2004 WL 
500860, *3–4 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2004) (simultaneous death). 
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doctrines, with some applying federal common law to yield a federal 
version of the preempted state law,142 and others simply concluding 
that the statute was not preempted.143 
1. Simultaneous Death 
 The simultaneous death of both spouses poses another set of prob-
lems in determining who should acquire each deceased spouse’s prop-
erty.144 For instance, in Estate of Morgan v. Estate of Morgan, an unpub-
lished Washington Court of Appeals decision from 2004, the court 
grappled with whether ERISA preempted a Colorado statute dictating 
the survivorship requirements in the event of simultaneous spousal 
death.145 Following the deaths of spouses Casey and Karen Morgan at 
the hands of Casey’s brother, Karen’s estate sued Casey’s estate for 
wrongful death and to claim the benefits of Karen’s life insurance pol-
icy.146 Casey had permitted his unstable brother, who had a fascination 
with guns and demonstrated violent tendencies, to live with them de-
spite Karen’s fears that the brother would harm them.147 In 1999, Ca-
sey’s brother gained access to Casey’s unlocked gun and ammunition 
and, beginning with Karen, shot and killed both spouses.148 
 Through her employer, Karen had participated in ERISA-governed 
life insurance and employee stock ownership plans, with Casey named 
as the beneficiary and her parents named as secondary beneficiaries if 
Casey did not survive her.149 The disposition of Casey’s and Karen’s es-
tates thus depended largely upon which survivorship provision applied, 
because the medical evidence appeared to indicate that Karen prede-
ceased Casey by a matter of minutes.150 In Colorado, which follows the 
revised Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, a spouse must survive for 120 
 
142 Johnson, 297 F.3d at 565–66. 
143 Morgan, 2004 WL 500860, at *3–4. 
144 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 80, 86. At common law, survival by a split sec-
ond was all that was legally required in order to inherit, a presumption later modified under 
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act (USDA). See id. at 80. Under the USDA, each spouse 
was deemed to have predeceased the other for purposes of testamentary transfers were there 
no sufficient evidence of survival. Id. Finally, the UPC and USDA were again modified, re-
placing the no sufficient evidence rule with the “120 hour rule,” which treats a spouse who 
dies within five days of the other spouse as having predeceased, permitting the property to 
pass to each spouses’ secondary taker and avoiding double probate. See id. at 86. 
145 See 2004 WL 500860, at *3–4. 
146 Id. at *1–2. 
147 Id. at *1. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at *2. 
150 See id. at *3–4. 
1500 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1481 
hours in order to inherit from the other spouse, which in this situation 
would have rendered Karen’s parents the proper beneficiaries of the 
plans.151 ERISA, however, is silent with respect to simultaneous death, 
and Casey’s parents used this silence to assert that they were entitled to 
the proceeds of Karen’s insurance as Casey’s heirs.152 The court, dismiss-
ing the estate’s Egelhoff objections in a footnote, ultimately concluded 
that the Colorado law “did not violate ERISA” and that Karen’s parents, 
not her in-laws, were the proper beneficiaries of her ERISA plans.153 
2. Substantial Compliance 
 A similar issue may arise when courts grapple with attempts to 
change beneficiaries in ERISA plans that fail to comply with the formal 
requirements, yet clearly communicate the participant’s intent to make 
such a change.154 Under wills law, the doctrine of substantial compli-
ance permits such errors to be disregarded if the testator substantially 
complies with the formalities of the relevant state’s Wills Act and it is 
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the document re-
flected the testator’s intent.155 With respect to ERISA plans, however, 
some courts have concluded that ERISA preempts the application of a 
state’s version of substantial compliance, turning instead to the federal 
common law to fill in this gap.156 
 For instance, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson, decided in 
2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used federal 
common law to apply a version of the substantial compliance doctrine 
after determining that the Illinois substantial compliance law was pre-
                                                                                                                      
151 See Morgan, 2004 WL 500860, at *3 & n.2 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-702(2) 
(2010) (codifying the 120-hour rule)). The 120-hour rule, created to address the problems 
of the previous USDA’s no sufficient evidence standard for survival, similarly serves to 
effect the testator’s presumed intent, assuming that the testator would prefer to see her 
estate go to her secondary taker rather than her spouse’s. See Dukeminier et al., supra 
note 3, at 80, 86. For an example of the inadequacies of the prior version (requiring no 
sufficient evidence of survival) that prompted this revision, see Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 
N.E.2d 418, 419–24 (Ill. 1985). 
152 Morgan, 2004 WL 500860, at *3. 
153 See id. at *4 & n.8. The court further concluded that a separate provision permitting 
plan administrators to retain discretion to determine beneficiaries under the plan entitled 
Karen’s parents to claim the funds even without deciding the preemption question. See id. 
154 See Johnson, 297 F.3d at 563–67. 
155See Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 253. Under the UPC, adopted in a minority 
of jurisdictions, the “harmless error” rule (or “dispensing power”) advocated by Professor 
Langbein goes one step further, requiring only clear and convincing evidence of testamen-
tary intent. See Unif. Probate Code § 2-503 (2008); Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 
261–63. 
156 See Johnson, 297 F.3d at 563–69. 
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empted by ERISA.157 In that case, Jimmie Johnson attempted to change 
the beneficiary of his ERISA-governed life insurance policy from his 
former spouse Mildred to his children born to another woman during 
his marriage to Mildred.158 While filling out the appropriate form, 
however, he made several errors, including mistakenly checking the 
wrong box to designate a plan in which he did not participate and list-
ing an incorrect address.159 At his death, Jimmie’s employer informed 
Mildred that she was the beneficiary, but Jimmie’s children contested 
this, referring to Jimmie’s change of beneficiary form to claim that they 
were the proper beneficiaries under the insurance plan.160 
 Mildred urged the court to apply the Illinois doctrine of substantial 
compliance, arguing that it was not preempted by ERISA and that Jim-
mie’s change of beneficiary request did not constitute substantial com-
pliance.161 Jimmie’s children, on the other hand, argued that ERISA 
preempted the Illinois statute and encouraged the court to apply fed-
eral common law and adopt the more lenient standard for substantial 
compliance set forth by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
in Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams in 1994.162 The Seventh Cir-
cuit in Johnson ultimately found the children’s argument persuasive, and 
concluded that ERISA did in fact preempt the Illinois substantial com-
pliance law.163 As a result, the court adopted the Fourth Circuit’s Phoenix 
Mutual articulation of substantial compliance as the federal common 
law.164 In applying that standard, the Seventh Circuit concluded that 
Jimmie’s attempted change of beneficiary was therefore effective.165 
 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 560–61 & n.1. 
159 Id. at 560–61. 
160 Id. at 561. 
161 Id. at 564 & n.5. Illinois’ substantial compliance standard would have required 
Jimmie’s children to “establish: (1) the certainty of [his] intent to change his beneficiary; 
and (2) that [he] did everything he reasonably could have done under the circumstances 
to carry out his intention to change the beneficiary.” Id. 
162 See Johnson, 297 F.3d at 567 (citing Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 30 F.3d 554, 
559 (4th Cir. 1994)). Under this theory of substantial compliance, Jimmie’s children 
needed only to demonstrate that Jimmie “(1) evidence[d] his . . . intent to make the 
change and (2) attempt[ed] to effectuate the change by undertaking positive action which 
is for all practical purposes similar to the action required by the change of beneficiary 
provisions of the policy.” Id. at 564. 
163 See id. at 566 (“Given the Supreme Court’s latest word on ERISA preemption in 
Egelhoff, we believe that a state law affecting the designation of a beneficiary is sufficiently 
‘related to’ an ERISA plan such that a state law doctrine of substantial compliance is pre-
empted by ERISA.”). 
164 Id. at 567–69. 
165 Id. 
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C. The Federal Common Law Solution in Light of Kennedy 
 Although many commentators have proposed the use of federal 
common law—informed by the Restatement or the Uniform Probate 
Code—as a solution to the Egelhoff problem,166 a recent U.S. Supreme 
Court case appears to have curbed the availability of such a response.167 
In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Kennedy v. Plan Administrator 
for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, ending the practice of using fed-
eral common law waivers to give effect to divorce decrees that divided 
interests in ERISA-governed policies without constituting a valid quali-
fied domestic relations order (“QDRO”).168 
 In Kennedy, the Supreme Court clarified a point on which the cir-
cuits had split: whether a divorce decree that failed to qualify as a 
QDRO under § 1056(d) could nevertheless permit a named beneficiary 
of an ERISA-governed plan to waive those benefits through the applica-
tion of federal common law and obligate the plan administrators to pay 
benefits in accordance with this waiver.169 Under ERISA’s express lan-
guage, QDROs were crafted as a rare exception to the antialienation 
provision of the statute, imposing strict requirements to meet the nar-
row exception.170 QDROs, unlike other state-level decisions regarding 
the division of probate and non-probate assets, were also expressly ex-
empted from the reach of ERISA’s preemption provisions.171 The circuit 
courts had nevertheless grappled with whether a divorce decree pur-
                                                                                                                      
166 See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 55, at 196–98; Gary, supra note 8, at 114–20. See generally 
Lebolt, supra note 9 (advocating for the creation of federal common law to address Egelhoff 
inequities); Andrew L. Oringer, A Regulatory Vacuum Leaves Gaping Wounds—Can Common 
Sense Offer a Better Way to Address the Pain of ERISA Preemption? 26 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 
409 (2009) (proposing that the federal common law be applied more robustly as an equi-
table solution when other remedies are preempted by ERISA). 
167 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 874–75; Patricia L. Vannoy, Note, RIP: The Federal Common 
Law Waiver Approach to Retirement Plan Death Benefits Finally Rests in Peace After Kennedy v. 
Plan Administrators for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 88 Neb. L. Rev. 204, 215–34 
(2009); see also Federal Common Law Does Not Apply in Light of Plan Documents Rule, 38 Com-
pensation Plan. J. 336, 336 (2010). 
168 See 129 S. Ct. at 870–77; supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
169 See, e.g., McGowan v. NRJ Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 244–48 (3d Cir. 2005) (conclud-
ing that plan administrators are not permitted to recognize the waiver); Estate of Altobelli 
v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1996) (concluding that “ERISA does not 
address this topic directly, so federal courts may resolve it by developing federal common 
law”); see also Vannoy, supra note 167, at 211–15 (describing the various approaches taken 
by the courts before Kennedy). 
170 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2006). This subsection dictates that “[e]ach pension 
plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alien-
ated.” Id. 
171 See id. 
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porting to divide a divorcing couple’s assets could validly waive the for-
mer spouse’s status as a beneficiary under the participant’s ERISA plan 
if it did not constitute a QDRO.172 In practical terms, such arrange-
ments served an identical purpose, but because they involved a depar-
ture from ERISA’s text in order to effect the presumptive intent of the 
decedent, they brought Egelhoff concerns back into sharp
 The Court in Kennedy abrogated cases on both sides of the circuit 
split, electing a middle ground which significantly diminished the ef-
fectiveness of the federal common law waiver.174 The Court determined 
that the waiver “is not rendered invalid by the text of the anti-alienation 
provision.”175 At the same time, however, the Court crafted an addi-
tional argument against this practice by determining that the waiver did 
not alter the plan administrators’ fiduciary obligation to “manage ER-
ISA plans ‘in accordance with the documents and instruments govern-
ing’ them” and that the administrators had thus “properly disregarded” 
the purported waiver.176 The Court thus demonstrated its commitment 
to a strict application of the plan documents rule.177 
 The Kennedy decision leaves open several questions.178 First, it 
notes that the “conclusion that § 1056(d)(1) does not make a nullity of 
the waiver leaves open any questions about the waiver’s effect in cir-
cumstances in which it is consistent with plan documents,” hinting that 
in certain limited circumstances, a common law waiver might not be 
entirely ineffective.179 Second, like Egelhoff, the Kennedy opinion de-
clines to address the application of the holding to slayer cases.180 Third, 
the Court expressly reserved judgment on whether an alternative state 
 
172 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870 (citing McGowan, 423 F.3d at 248–50; Altobelli, 77 F.3d 
at 80–82). 
173 See id. at 876. The Kennedy Court clarified that enforcing QDROs, although an ex-
ception to the antialienation rule, should not be seen as a departure from the plan docu-
ments rule. Id. Instead, QDROs are to be considered plan documents themselves. Id. Thus, 
the enforcement of a QDRO does not conflict with the obligation of plan administrators to 
administer ERISA plans in accordance with the plan documents. Id. 
174 Id. at 874–75. 
175 Id. at 868. This is contrary to what some commentators had assumed prior to Ken-
nedy. See, e.g., Albert Feuer, Who Is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?, 40 John 
Marshall L. Rev. 919, 922 (2007). 
176 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 868. 
177 See id. at 875–76. 
178 See id. at 874–77 & nn.10–14. 
179 See id. at 874–75 & n.10. 
180 Id. at 877 n.14. (“The Estate also contends that requiring a plan administrator to 
distribute benefits in conformity with plan documents will allow a beneficiary who mur-
ders a participant to obtain benefits under the terms of the plan. The ‘slayer’ case is not 
before us, and we do not address it.”). 
1504 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 52:1481 
remedy such as a constructive trust might be available to the intended 
beneficiary when preemption applies and the federal common law ap-
proach fails.181 Nevertheless, the reasoning of the Kennedy holding calls 
into question the federal common law approach to the slayer issue.182 
IV. Slayer Statutes and Revocation-On-Divorce Laws:  
Is the Distinction Tenable? 
 Although Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Invest-
ment Plan approaches its analysis from a plan documents rather than a 
preemption perspective,183 the factual circumstances surrounding that 
case invite comparisons to Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner.184 In both 
cases, the Court’s application of ERISA prevented funds from the de-
ceased participant’s employee benefit plan from being disbursed ac-
cording to the decedent’s likely wishes following divorce.185 Instead, 
ERISA’s preemption and plan documents rules compelled an outcome 
granting the benefits to the former spouse, contrary to what the par-
ticipant likely intended.186 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s unanimous 
opinion in Kennedy demonstrates an explicit reliance on Egelhoff and 
Boggs v. Boggs in reaching its conclusion.187 As a result, Kennedy is poten-
tially applicable to both the analogous revocation-on-divorce problem 
as seen in Egelhoff and to other cases under which ERISA and the sub-
sidiary laws of wills conflict.188 
 This Part asserts that the distinction between revocation-on-divorce 
and slayer statutes for preemption purposes is untenable, and further 
argues that the distinction for purposes of the federal common law so-
lution, although less obviously problematic, may still prove unfeasi-
ble.189 In addition, Section C examines several other solutions to this 
                                                                                                                      
181 See id. at 875 n.10. See generally Rayho, supra note 61 (describing the benefits of the 
constructive trust in a post-Egelhoff ERISA preemption framework). 
182 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 875 n.10. 
183 See 129 S. Ct. 865, 876–77 (2009). Only divorce decrees that meet the requirements 
of a QDRO fall under the limited exception to preemption under § 1144(b)(7). 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1144(b)(7) (2006). All others are expressly preempted. Id. 
184 See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff ex rel. Breiner, 532 U.S. 141, 144 (2001). 
185 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
186 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 870; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
187 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 876–77 (citing Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 143 (majority opin-
ion)); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850 (1997)). 
188 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
189 See infra notes 191–209 and accompanying text. 
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problem and concludes that Congressional amendment of ERISA is the 
most appropriate manner of responding to this difficulty.190 
A. Distinguishing Between Slayer Statutes and Revocation-on-Divorce Laws for 
Preemption Purposes Is Untenable 
 Following Kennedy, the determination of whether slayer statutes can 
be distinguished from revocation-on-divorce laws takes on an increasing 
importance, as the federal common law solution to the revocation-on-
divorce problem has now been largely eroded.191 Whether one spouse 
murders the other or a spouse dies after a divorce division of assets but 
before changing the beneficiary, the application of preemption would 
thwart the decedent’s likely intent.192 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
has been unwilling to consider the equities at stake in such cases and 
has interpreted ERISA preemption in its broadest terms.193 It seems dif-
ficult to justify a distinction between the doctrines for purposes of pre-
emption, making it likely that a slayer case brought before the Supreme 
Court would yield a result consistent with Kennedy.194 
 In attempting to distinguish these doctrines, courts have observed 
that the federal tradition of barring slayers from taking is deeply rooted 
in American jurisprudence, making incorporation of the federal com-
mon law in such cases arguably more appropriate than in the divorce 
instance.195 Slayer statutes are intended to promote the fundamental 
maxim that killers should not be permitted to profit from their crimes, 
and are in essence a form of avoiding unjust enrichment.196 Preemp-
tion of revocation-on-divorce statutes does lead to inequitable results, 
but that outcome is less outrageous than the result of preemption in 
the slayer case.197 Moreover, the ease with which the undesirable result 
could have been avoided is far greater in the revocation-on-divorce 
 
190 See infra notes 210–255 and accompanying text. 
191 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 876–77. 
192 See Lebolt, supra note 9, at 59. 
193 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lebolt, supra note 9, at 31. 
194 See Thomas E. Lund, Filling the Void: Incorporation of State Law Principles in Plan Docu-
ments, Benefits L.J., Winter 2009, at 29, 31–32. 
195 See N.Y. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886); Riggs v. Palmer, 
22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). 
196 See In re Estate of Mahoney, 220 A.2d 475, 477 (Vt. 1966); Robert D. McClure, Note, 
Thou Shall Not Kill (Thy Spouse): A Recent Exception to the ERISA Preemption Doctrine, 29 J. Fam. 
Law 129, 130 (1990). 
197 See Addison v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (W.D. Va. 1998) (citing 
New Orleans Elec. Pension Fund v. DeRocha, 779 F. Supp. 849, 850 n.7 (E.D. La. 1991)) 
(stating that slayer statutes prevent distributions that are “morally repugnant as well as a 
clear violation of reasonable public policy principle”); Lebolt, supra note 9, at 59–61. 
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case, where the participant could have simply filled out a change of be-
neficiary form.198 In the slayer context, by contrast, the slain participant 
cannot be faulted for neglecting to update a beneficiary form.199 
 Nonetheless, the distinction between slayer statutes and revocation 
on death provisions articulated in dicta by the Egelhoff majority does not 
reflect the reality of the slayer statute framework.200 Like revocation-on-
divorce principles, slayer rules vary widely from state to state.201 As a 
result, from a uniform plan administration perspective, the slayer rule 
would require plan administrators to master the same set of conflicting 
state laws, rendering the slayer rule unlikely to escape ERISA’s preemp-
tive effect.202 
B. Kennedy Might Not Foreclose a Federal Common Law Solution  
for the Slayer Problem 
 Even if the courts ultimately do reject the notion that slayer stat-
utes are sufficiently different from revocation-on-divorce statutes to 
evade preemption, it might still be possible to permit such statutes as a 
                                                                                                                      
198 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 (“The plan provided an easy way for [the participant] 
to change the designation, but for whatever reason he did not.”); Norwood, supra note 82, 
at 78. One author further argues that: 
If the participant wants to change his or her beneficiary designation after a 
divorce, the participant simply has to file a new beneficiary designation form 
with the plan administrator. If the participant chooses, for whatever reason, 
not to submit a new beneficiary designation form after a divorce, the partici-
pant is on notice that his or her ex-spouse remains the named beneficiary 
and will receive some or all of his or her plan benefits upon the participant’s 
death. 
Norwood, supra note 82, at 78. For an alternative perspective casting doubt on this fault-
based assumption, see Gary, supra note 8, at 124 which notes that due to a “lack of under-
standing of the legal rules,” participants often believe that they do not need to change 
beneficiary designations following a divorce on the mistaken assumption that the divorce 
decree itself enacts this change. 
199 See Norwood, supra note 82, at 78. 
200 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
201 See Salkin, supra note 7, at 9 (describing the manners in which state slayer statutes 
vary). In Wisconsin, for instance, a spouse may knowingly opt out of the protection of the 
slayer statute entirely, permitting a spouse to ensure that his or her mentally ill spouse will 
not be denied an inheritance following violence related to the illness. See Wis. Stat. Ann. 
§ 854.14(6)(b) (West 2008). Other variations emerge when distinguishing between inten-
tional and unintentional killings, or preventing the killer’s heirs from being named as 
substitute takers after the slayer has been barred. See Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 
149–51. 
202 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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matter of federal common law while avoiding the Kennedy problem.203 
Kennedy arguably does not foreclose the application of the federal 
common law in a spousal homicide situation.204 A primary distinction 
between these two scenarios is that ERISA already provides a mecha-
nism for divorcees to modify the distribution of benefits under an em-
ployee benefit policy: the qualified domestic relations order 
(QDRO).205 ERISA, however, is silent with respect to slayers.206 Such 
silence, coupled with almost inescapable preemption in the wake of 
Egelhoff, makes this rule a prime candidate for federal common law to 
fill in the resulting gap.207 
 Nevertheless, even the slayer cases have become increasingly diffi-
cult to square with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kennedy, as the plan 
documents themselves would still be at odds with the ultimate benefici-
ary identification.208 If the Court continues its stringent application of 
the plan documents rule as articulated in Kennedy, the federal common 
law may be unavailable as a remedy in the context of the slayer rule or 
the many other state law doctrines regarding succession.209 
C. Other Possible Solutions to Preserve the Subsidiary Law of Wills  
in the ERISA Framework 
 With federal common law an uncertain solution in light of Ken-
nedy, slayer statutes and other subsidiary laws of wills as applied to will 
substitutes should be pegged to something more substantial if their eq-
uitable results—and the overarching goal of unifying the law of wills 
and will substitutes—are to be realized.210 In addition, if results such as 
those in Egelhoff are to be avoided, more substantial modifications to 
 
203 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 n.14 (declining to address whether the plan docu-
ments rule would similarly extend to the slayer case). 
204 See id. 
205 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2006). 
206 Addison, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 393. 
207 See Ahmed v. Ahmed, 817 N.E.2d 424, 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 
208 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 877 n.14. 
209 See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 159–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Federal Common Law Does Not 
Apply in Light of Plan Documents Rule, supra note 167, at 336 (discussing Matschiner v. Hart-
ford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 622 F.3d 885, 887–89 (8th Cir. 2010)). 
210 See, e.g., Gary, supra note 8, at 124 (noting the need for Congressional action to 
cure the revocation-on-divorce problem); Lund, supra note 194, at 32; Rayho, supra note 
61, at 389–90. But see Salkin, supra note 7, at 5 (predicting that because slayer statutes so 
rarely interact with ERISA concerns, “[i]n all likelihood, neither the application of the 
plan document rule of Kennedy or the ERISA preemption principles of Egelhoff to a state 
slayer statute will ever come before the Supreme Court”). 
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ERISA itself are likely necessary.211 This Section discusses several ave-
nues by which these improvements could arise, including: modifying 
divorce decrees at the state probate court level to comply with QDRO 
requirements; altering the plan documents governing such plans to 
incorporate these endangered doctrines; permitting a state cause of 
action for intended beneficiaries to recover the funds paid to former 
spouses or slayers; reconsidering the Supreme Court’s ERISA preemp-
tion jurisprudence in accordance with Justice Scalia’s earlier recom-
mendations; or amending ERISA itself to address these issues.212 
1. Improve Ordinary Divorce Decrees’ Adherence to QDRO 
Requirements 
 The simplest solution for the revocation-on-divorce issues encoun-
tered in both Egelhoff and Kennedy would be to encourage judges who 
issue divorce decrees purporting to divide a divorcing couple’s pension 
plans to be cognizant of the QDRO requirements set forth in 
§ 1056(d).213 Valid divorce decrees existed in both Kennedy and Egelhoff, 
both of which attempted to alter the allocation of the spouses’ pension 
benefits, but because they did not meet the QDRO requirements they 
failed to validly modify the plan documents.214 As the Court noted in 
Kennedy, however, a QDRO should be considered part of the plan doc-
uments with respect to the plan administrator’s obligation to enforce 
plan documents, permitting a valid QDRO divorce decree to escape 
both the plan documents and the preemption problems.215 The set of 
information required to render a domestic relations order “qualified” 
may be highly specific; yet, the components themselves—such as ad-
dresses of beneficiaries, and the names of the specific plans affected by 
the order—are relatively straightforward and would not appear to im-
pose an unreasonable judicial or administrative burden.216 
                                                                                                                      
 
211 See Gallanis, supra note 55, at 193–97; Gary, supra note 8, at 124–26. 
212 See infra notes 213–255 and accompanying text. 
213 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3) (2006) (describing the requirements for a valid QDRO). 
Alternatively, judges or advocates at the state level could be encouraged to inform the 
parties to a divorce that the arrangement still requires action in order to finalize the 
change of beneficiary, which might reduce the possibility of participants being misin-
formed about the effect of the divorce decree. See Gary, supra note 8, at 124. 
214 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 869; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 144. 
215 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 876. QDROs are explicitly excluded from ERISA’s broad 
preemptive scheme. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(7). 
216 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3). In addition, to attain qualified status, a domestic rela-
tions order must not attempt to obligate the plan to provide a benefit not otherwise pro-
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 Because this solution addresses divorce alone and does not affect 
the treatment of slayer statutes, simultaneous death provisions, and 
other subsidiary law of wills, this would prove inadequate.217 Until ER-
ISA itself is modified, however, increasing the percentage of divorce 
decrees that meet QDRO requirements would reduce the sting of at 
least one of the statute’s greatest inequities.218 
2. Modification of ERISA Plan Documents to Incorporate a Uniform 
Approach to Subsidiary Laws of Wills 
 A more comprehensive way to avoid these undesirable collisions 
between ERISA and the subsidiary law of wills would be for plan admin-
istrators to alter the plan documents themselves.219 Plan administrators 
could simply incorporate a particular state’s substantive laws governing 
wills or will substitutes, adopt the UPC or the Restatement approach, or 
craft their own approaches to such issues within the plan document 
itself, bringing them into line with the plan documents requirements 
under Kennedy.220 
 Commentators are divided with respect to the feasibility of this ap-
proach.221 Some question the likelihood that plan administrators would 
assume this additional obligation on their own.222 By crafting and main-
taining their own standards for these issues, however, plan administra-
 
vided under its terms, increase the benefits to be paid by the plan, or redirect payments 
previously designated to another alternate beneficiary under an earlier QDRO. Id. 
217 See Vannoy, supra note 167, at 209–10. 
218 See Gary, supra note 8, at 124. 
219 See Dukeminier et al., supra note 3, at 431; see also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the additional burden on plan administrators could be reduced 
“by resolving the divorce revocation issue in the plan documents themselves, stating ex-
pressly that state law does not apply”). 
220 See Lund, supra note 194, at 34–36. Lund provides the following as a model plan 
document provision: 
Effect of Divorce. If the participant’s marriage ends by the entry of a decree 
of divorce, dissolution of marriage or annulment, a designation of the par-
ticipant’s spouse as beneficiary made by the participant prior to such entry 
will be applied as if the participant’s former spouse had predeceased the par-
ticipant; provided that this provision will not apply if the participant and such 
former spouse subsequently marry and are married at the participant’s death. 
Id. at 34. 
221 Compare Lund, supra note 194, at 36 (noting that plan administrators would be well 
served to address such issues directly so as to avoid litigation), with Gallanis, supra note 55, 
at 196 (expressing skepticism about plan administrators’ acceptance of such a proposal), 
and Rayho, supra note 61, at 389 (same). 
222 See, e.g., Gallanis, supra note 55, at 196; Rayho, supra note 61, at 388. 
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tors would fulfill their fiduciary obligations to administer plans in ac-
cordance with the governing documents without sacrificing equitable 
results.223 For instance, if plan documents were to note that a valid di-
vorce decree would automatically revoke a beneficiary designation of a 
former spouse—the result endorsed by the UPC, the Restatement, and a 
number of states—then the administrative burden of applying such 
doctrines would likely prove similar to the effects of the current QDRO 
system.224 Thus, the additional burden may be overstated when com-
pared to the litigation costs associated with the inevitable suits against 
unjustly enriched former spouses.225 
3. Application of Constructive Trusts to Avoid Unjust Enrichment 
 Because the problem of the slayer and the ex-spouse is one fun-
damentally related to the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, sev-
eral commentators have argued that it would be appropriate, absent 
congressional action to amend ERISA, to turn to equity to address 
these situations.226 State courts have frequently used constructive trusts 
in the slayer statute context.227 This remedy permits the courts to avoid 
redrafting the decedent’s will by giving legal title to the slayer while re-
serving equitable title for the benefit of the next taker under the will or 
intestacy.228 As a result, constructive trusts would also provide an ap-
propriate response to issues of substantial compliance, simultaneous 
death, or many of the other wills law doctrines likely to interact with the 
broad application of ERISA preemption.229 
 Such actions are cumbersome, as they require a state-level suit to 
be brought after the funds have been paid to the beneficiary listed un-
der the plan documents.230 The primary benefit of such an approach, 
however, is that it does not interfere with uniform plan administration, 
thereby avoiding the most common criticism of other proposed ERISA 
modifications.231 
                                                                                                                      
223 See Lund, supra note 194, at 34–36. 
224 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G) (2006); Unif. Probate Code § 2-804 (2008); Re-
statement (Third) of Prop.: Wills & Other Donative Transfers § 7.2 & cmt. (2003). 
225 See Lund, supra note 194, at 34–36. 
226 See, e.g., Gary, supra note 8, at 120–23; Rayho, supra note 61, at 390–97. 
227 See, e.g., Mahoney, 220 A.2d at 477–78; Abbey v. Lord, 336 P.2d 226, 230–32 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1959). 
228 See, e.g., Mahoney, 220 A.2d at 477–79; Abbey, 336 P.2d at 230–31. 
229 See Gary, supra note 8, at 120–23; Rayho, supra note 61, at 390–91. 
230 See Gary supra note 8, at 123. 
231 See Rayho, supra note 61, at 390–91. 
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 Even under the constructive trust framework, however, evasion of 
preemption is not guaranteed.232 The Kennedy court expressly declined 
to answer whether the presumptively intended beneficiary would be 
precluded from asserting a claim against the former spouse in state or 
federal court to recoup the benefits of the plan.233 As a result, following 
Kennedy, the constructive trust doctrine joins the federal common law 
response as an uncertain solution to this problem.234 
4. Reconsideration of ERISA Preemption Jurisprudence 
 Several Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court have expressed their 
disagreement with ERISA preemption both in general and as applied 
in cases analyzing the clash of ERISA and state wills laws, leaving open 
the faint possibility that the preemption problem could be alleviated to 
some degree by the Supreme Court itself.235 Some of the most egre-
gious results—such as preemption of state slayer statutes—would po-
tentially be avoidable were the Court to accept Justices Scalia’s request 
that it “simply acknowledge that [its] first take on this statute was 
wrong” and revisit the meaning of preemption.236 Justice Scalia further 
opined “that the ‘relate to’ clause of the pre-emption provision is 
meant, not to set forth a test for pre-emption, but rather to identify the 
field in which ordinary field pre-emption applies—namely, the field of 
laws regulating ‘employee benefit plan[s]’ . . . .”237 Such an approach 
appears to be endorsed by ERISA’s legislative history and could provide 
an avenue for concluding that many of the subsidiary laws of wills that 
do not directly conflict with ERISA are outside the statute’s reach.238 
 
232 See Kennedy, 129 S. Ct. at 875 n.10. 
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 The problem of determining exactly what constitutes a conflicting 
statute or one that occupies the field of employee benefit plans, how-
ever, would persist irrespective of the preemption scheme applied.239 
Moreover, a unanimous Court decided Kennedy, reaffirming the Court’s 
determination that strict adherence to the plan documents constituted 
“good and sufficient reasons for holding the line, just as we have done 
in cases of state laws that might blur the bright-line requirement to fol-
low plan documents in distributing benefits,” and that “[w]hat goes for 
inconsistent state law goes for a federal common law of waiver that 
might obscure a plan administrator’s duty” to follow plan docu-
ments.240 In addition, neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Ginsburg joined 
Justice Breyer in Egelhoff, indicating that this appearance of a desire for 
ERISA reconsideration among the Justices may be illusory.241 Neverthe-
less, permitting ERISA to back away from its overbroad “relate to” pre-
emption scheme—and its many perverse effects—would be a first step 
toward reconciling ERISA and state laws of succession.242 
                                                                                                                     
5. Amendments to ERISA 
 Ultimately, the most appropriate and comprehensive method of 
ERISA amelioration would be to amend the statute itself.243 Congress 
could amend ERISA in several ways to lessen the conflicts between the 
subsidiary law of wills—intended to effect the presumptive intents of 
decedents—and the laws governing pension plans, designed to protect 
the benefit plans of those same people.244 
 Minor changes to the QDRO provision itself, for instance, could 
increase the number of divorce decrees that qualify under its terms, 
bringing divorced participants’ likely intents into line with the actual 
workings of ERISA.245 One commentator has argued that the practical 
effect of a divorce decree purporting to reallocate pension benefits may 
be to cause participants to believe that their entitlements to each oth-
er’s pension plans are extinguished.246 By modifying the QDRO provi-
sion, this intuitive result would be ratified.247 Additionally, any domestic 
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relations order received by a plan administrator must go through the 
analysis set forth in § 1056(g), which creates a process for determining 
the qualified status of such domestic relations orders.248 This indicates 
that the additional burden of expanding QDROs to cover most—if not 
all—domestic relations orders would not impose a significantly larger 
burden on plan administrators, who are already statutorily charged 
with thoroughly reviewing such designations.249 
 Alternatively, Congress could promulgate guidelines for slayer cas-
es, revocation-on-divorce, and simultaneous death and survivorship, or 
could expressly permit the courts to look to the Uniform Probate Code 
or Restatement in reaching these decisions.250 This is not without prece-
dent in ERISA jurisprudence; QDROs were themselves enacted under 
REAct to “ratify a judicial exception” to ERISA’s strict antialienation 
rule.251 Many courts are already taking matters into their own hands 
with respect to the slayer statute, rendering it a functionally similar ju-
dicial exception in need of analogous ratification.252 
 Finally, Congress could amend ERISA to modify its preemption 
scheme, bringing it more in line with standard preemption jurispru-
dence.253 There is evidence in ERISA’s legislative history that the “re-
late-to” preemption provision was not originally intended to be a new 
class of preemption but rather to follow standard patterns of preemp-
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tion jurisprudence.254 By narrowing ERISA’s preemptive approach in 
this manner and avoiding the confusion of “relate-to” preemption, the 
statute would permit states to maintain their sovereignty over the tradi-
tional sphere of family law, an area in which states are better equipped 
to handle evolving issues of succession.255 
Conclusion 
 Protection of employee benefit plan participants—one of ERISA’s 
principal goals—is falling victim to an overzealous preemption scheme. 
By declaring state laws governing inheritance in the divorce context to 
be preempted, undermining plan participants’ likely intent, recent ER-
ISA jurisprudence threatens to swallow not only the state laws govern-
ing revocation-on-divorce but also a variety of other state laws devel-
oped through states’ extensive experience in the wills law realm. Even 
slayer statutes, which prevent murderers from inheriting from their vic-
tims, now seem incapable of escaping ERISA preemption. Although 
there are several stopgap measures potentially available to the courts, to 
the plan administrators, and to the presumptively intended beneficiar-
ies who are prevented from claiming expectancies from the plan ad-
ministrators directly, the most effective solution requires Congress to 
amend ERISA. These amendments may affect uniform plan admini-
stration to a degree, but the additional administrative burden seems 
grossly overstated when compared to the inequitable results. Maintain-
ing ERISA in its current state constitutes little more than an abandon-
ment of its founding principle. 
Katherine A. McAllister 
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